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Abstract 
The purpose of this paper is to present an exercise where we identify optimal income tax rules under the 
constraint of fixed tax revenue. To this end, we estimate a microeconomic model with 78 parameters that 
capture heterogeneity in consumption-leisure preferences for singles and couples as well as in job opportunities 
across individuals based on detailed Norwegian household data for 1994. For any given tax rule, the estimated 
model can be used to simulate the choices made by single individuals and couples. Those choices are therefore 
generated by preferences and opportunities that vary across the decision units. Differently from what is 
common in the literature, we do not rely on a priori theoretical optimal taxation results, but instead we identify 
optimal tax rules – within a class of 6-parameter piece-wise linear rules - by iteratively running the model until 
a given social welfare function attains its maximum under the constraint of keeping constant the total net tax 
revenue. We explore a variety of social welfare functions with differing degree of inequality aversion and also 
two alternative social welfare principles, namely equality of outcome and equality of opportunity. All the 
social welfare functions turn out to imply an average tax rate lower than the current 1994 one. Moreover, all 
the optimal rules imply – with respect to the current rule – lower marginal rates on low and/or average income 
levels and higher marginal rates on relatively high income levels. These results are partially at odds with the 
tax reforms that took place in many countries during the last decades. While those reforms embodied the idea 
of lowering average tax rates, the way to implement it has typically consisted in reducing the top marginal 
rates. Our results instead suggest to lower average tax rates by reducing marginal rates on low and average 
income levels and increasing marginal rates on very high income levels. 
 
  
Keywords: Labour supply, optimal taxation, random utility model, microsimulation. 
 
JEL classification: H21, H31, J22. 
Acknowledgement: We would like to thank Tom Wennemo for skilful programming assistance, 
Anne Skoglund for editing the paper and Terje Skjerpen for careful proofreading. The Norwegian 
Research Council, the Italian Ministry of University and Research and the Compagnia di San Paolo 
has provided financial support for this project. Parts of this paper were written when Rolf Aaberge 
was visiting ICER in Torino. ICER is gratefully acknowledged for providing financial support and 
excellent working conditions. 
 
Address: Rolf Aaberge, Research Department, Statistics Norway. E-mail: rolf.aaberge@ssb.no 
Tel.: +4721094864, Fax: +4721090040. 
Ugo Colombino, Dipartimento di Economia, Torino, Italy and Research Department, Statistics 
Norway. E-mail: ugo.colombino@unito.it 2 
1. Introduction 
This paper presents an empirical analysis of optimal taxation. The purpose is not new, but the exercise 
illustrated here differs in many important ways from previous attempts to empirically compute optimal 
taxes. The standard procedure adopted in the literature starts with some version of the optimal taxation 
framework originally set up in the seminal paper by Mirlees (1971). The next step typically consists of 
feeding with numbers – taken from some previous empirical analysis - the formulas produced by the 
theory. This literature is surveyed by Tuomala (1990). A recent strand of research adopts the same 
approach to address the inverse optimal taxation problem, i.e. retrieving the social welfare function 
that makes optimal a given tax rule (Bourguignon and Spadaro, 2005). There are two main problems 
with this literature: 1) the theoretical results become amenable to an operational interpretation only by 
adopting some special assumptions concerning the preferences, the composition of the population and 
the structure of the tax rule; 2) the empirical measures used as counterparts of the theoretical concepts 
are usually derived from previous estimates obtained under assumptions that may be different from 
those used in the theoretical model. As a consequence the consistency between the theoretical model 
and the empirical measures is dubious and the significance of the numerical results remains uncertain. 
An important contribution by Saez (2001) makes Mirlees’ results more easily operational by 
reformulating them in terms of labour (or income) supply elasticities in order to provide a more direct 
link between theoretical results and empirical measures. Also, a recent paper by Laroque (2005) 
departs substantially from the Mirlees’ tradition and proposes a simpler framework that focuses upon 
the determination of the Laffer bound (the tax rate that maximizes the tax revenue). Although these 
new contributions are interesting and useful in easing the empirical implementation of theoretical 
results, they might still suffer from a possible inconsistency between the theoretical model and the 
empirical measures used to implement the models. As main remaining limitations of this literature we 
may mention: (a) the agent is the individual and simultaneous household decisions are ignored; (b) 
quantity constraints and limitations on the choice of hours of work are ignored; (c) participation 
decisions and hours decisions are typically not simultaneously accounted for: either the hours decision 
(as in Mirlees 1971) or the participation decision (as in Diamond 1980) is modelled.
1  
  Although those limitations and other restrictive assumptions may be overcome in the future, 
we follow here a completely different approach. We do not start from theoretical results dictating 
conditions for optimal tax rules under various assumptions. Instead we use a microeconometric model 
of labour supply in order to identify by simulation the tax rule that maximizes a social welfare 
                                                 
1 A notable exception is Saez (2002) where both participation and hour’s decisions are combined using some rather restrictive 
simplifying assumptions. An interesting empirical application of Saez’s model is provided by Blundell et al. (2006).  
  3 
function. The microeconometric simulation approach is common in evaluating tax reforms, but has not 
been much used in empirical optimal taxation studies.
2 The closest previous example adopting a 
similar approach is probably represented by Fortin, Truchon and Beauséjour (1993), who however use 
a calibrated (not estimated) model with rather restrictive (Stone-Geary) preferences and focus on 
alternative income support schemes rather than on the whole tax rule. We develop a microeconometric 
model of labour supply that allows for a rather flexible representation of preferences, embodies an 
exact representation of taxes and transfers, represents simultaneous decisions of household members 
and accounts for quantity constraints on labour supply choices.  
  The microeconometric model is briefly presented in Section 2. In the Appendix we present 
the empirical specification of the utility functions and the choice sets and we provide the estimation 
results based on Norwegian data. The main behavioural implications of the estimates are illustrated by 
the labour supply elasticities in Section 3. Once estimated, the model can be run to simulate choices 
and individual welfare levels for a sample of households given any particular tax rule. However, since 
preferences are heterogeneous and some individuals live as singles whereas others form families and 
live together it does not make sense to treat the estimated utility functions as comparable individual 
welfare functions. Thus, it is required to introduce measures of individual welfare that justify 
interpersonal comparisons. Section 4.1 explains the procedure we follow to circumvent the problem. 
  As explained in Section 4.2, aggregation of welfare levels across individual is made by using 
members from a class of rank-dependent social welfare functions with varying degree of inequality-
aversion and relying on two alternative social welfare criteria; Equality of Opportunity (EOp) and the 
more traditional Equality of Outcome (EO). The latter consists in maximizing a weighted sum of 
individual welfare levels. The former is a computable concept of equality of opportunity developed by 
Roemer (1998). The idea motivating the development of this new criterion is that “outcomes” are the 
joint result of “opportunities” and “effort”, and that the social planner might wish to account for the 
inequality due to unequal “opportunities” but not for the inequality due to unequal “effort”. In a 
previous contribution that originated from an international research project (Roemer et al. 2003), this 
concept has been applied to evaluate the EOp performance of income tax rules in various countries, 
using a relatively simple common model of labour supply behaviour with calibrated parameters. Under 
this respect, this paper extends the previous study in several respects. First, in order to allow for 
alternative weighting profiles in the treatment of income differentials that arise from factors beyond 
the individuals' control, a generalized version of Roemer’s (1998) EOp-criterion is introduced. 
Secondly, we employ a relatively sophisticated model of labour supply that provides a simultaneous 
treatment of partners’ decisions and accounts for quantity constraints on the distribution of hours. 
                                                 
2 A recent survey of microsimulation analyses of tax system is provided by Bourguignon and Spadaro (2006). 4 
Finally, while the previous study only concerned male heads of household's 25-40 years old this study 
deals with approximately the entire labour force.  
  Finally, we identify optimal tax rules – within a class of 6-parameter piece-wise linear rules - 
by iteratively running the model until the social welfare function is maximized under the constraint of 
keeping constant the total net tax revenue. The resulting optimal tax rules are presented in Section 5. 
Section 6 contains the final comments.  
2. The microeconometric labour supply model 
The labour supply model used in this study is detailed described in Appendix A. Here we give a bird-
eye presentation. The model can be considered as an extension of the standard multinomial logit 
model, and differs from the traditional models of labour supply in several respects.
 3 First, it accounts 
for observed as well as unobserved heterogeneity in tastes and choice constraints, which means that it 
is able to take into account the presence of quantity constraints in the market. Second, it includes both 
single person households and married or cohabiting couples making joint labour supply decisions. A 
proper model of the interaction between spouses in their labour supply decisions is important as most 
of the individuals are married or cohabiting. Third, by taking all details in the tax system into account 
the budget sets become complex and non-convex in certain intervals.  
  For expository simplicity we consider in this section only the behaviour of a single person 
household. In the model, agents choose among jobs characterized by the wage rate w, hours of work h 
and other characteristics. The problem solved by the agent looks like the following: 
(2.1) 







subject to the budget constraint  ( ) ,, cfwhI =  where h denotes hours of work, w is the pre-tax wage 
rate, j and e  indicate respectively other observed and unobserved job and/or household 
characteristics, I is the pre-tax non-labour income (exogenous), c is disposable income, f  represents 
the tax rule that transforms pre-tax incomes (wh,I) into net income c, B denotes the set of all 
opportunities available to the household (including non-market opportunities, i.e. a “job” with  0 w=  
and  0 h = ). 
                                                 
3 Examples of previous applications of this approach are found in Aaberge, Dagsvik and Strøm (1995), and Aaberge, 
Colombino and Strøm (1999, 2000). The modeling approach used in these studies differs from the standard labour supply 
models by characterizing behaviour in terms of a comparison between utility levels rather than between marginal variations 
of utility. These models are close to other recent contributions adopting a discrete choice approach such as Dickens and 
Lundberg (1993) and Euwals and van Soest (1999).   5 
  Agents can differ not only in their preferences and in their wage (as in the traditional model) 
but also in the number of available jobs of different type. Moreover, for the same agent, wage rates 
(unlike in the traditional model) can differ from job to job. As analysts we observe the chosen h and w, 
but we do not know exactly what opportunities are contained in B. Therefore we use a probability 
density function to represent B. Let  (,,) phwjdenote the density of jobs of type (,,). hwj  By 
specifying a probability density function on B we can for example allow for the fact that jobs with 
hours of work in a certain range are more or less likely to be found, possibly depending on agents’ 
characteristics; or for the fact that for different agents the relative number of market opportunities may 
differ. We assume that the utility function can be factorised as 
(2.2)  ( ) ( ) (,),,,(,),, UfwhIhjvfwhIhj ee = , 
where v and e are the systematic and the stochastic component, respectively. Moreover, we assume 
that e  is i.i.d. according to: 
(2.3)  ( ) ( )
1 Prexp uu e
- £=- . 
We observe the chosen h ,w and j. Therefore we can specify the probability that the agent chooses a 
job with observed characteristics (h,w,j). Let  (,,) BwhjB ￿  denote the subset of feasible jobs with 
hours h, wage rate w and other observable job attributes j. The term e is a random taste-shifter that 
accounts for the effect on utility of all the characteristics of the household-job match observed by the 
household but not by us. It can be shown that under the assumptions (2.1), (2.2) and (2.3) we can write 
the probability density function of a choice (h,w,j) as
4 
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where  (,,) phwjis the density of choice opportunities which can be interpreted as the relative 
frequency (in the choice set B) of job opportunities of type (h, w, j). Opportunities with  0 = h (and 
0 = w ) are non-market opportunities (i.e. alternative allocations of "leisure"). The density (2.4) is the 
contribution of an observation (h, w, j) to the likelihood function, which is then maximized in order to 
estimate the parameters of  ((,),,) vfwhIhjand of  (,,) phwj. 
                                                 
4 For the derivation of the choice density (2.4), see Aaberge et al. (1999). Note that (2.4) can be considered as a special case 
of the more general multinomial type of framework introduced by Ben-Akiva and Watanatada (1981) and Dagsvik (1994).. 6 
  The intuition behind expression (2.4) is that the probability of a choice (h,w,j) can be 
expressed as the relative attractiveness – weighted by a measure of “availability” p(h,w,j) – of jobs of 
type (h,w,j). 
  It is important to stress that household member choose among jobs (characterized by h, w 
and other factors j), not just among different values of h. Theoretical optimal taxation models typically 
consider effort as the agents’ choice variable. Effort does not coincide with hours of work; it might 
include searching for jobs of better quality etc. On the other hand, empirical models of labour supply 
used for tax reform evaluations have traditionally considered hours of work as the sole choice variable, 
implicitly equating hours of work and effort. Exceptions are provided by Bourguignon and Spadaro 
(2005) and by Bargain (2006), who under rather special assumptions are able to impute to each agent 
an effort value. In our model we do not strictly identify effort and hours of work, since the agent 
chooses a package that includes not only hours but also wage rates and other job characteristics. 
  As explained in Appendix A, the model contains 78 parameters that capture the 
heterogeneity in preferences and opportunities among households and individuals. This version of the 
model is used to simulate the choices given a particular tax rule. Those choices are therefore generated 
by preferences and opportunities that vary across the decision units. For the purpose of welfare 
evaluation, however, we also estimate a common utility function where we account for differences in 
availability of job opportunities. It is this common utility function that is used to compute and compare 
the individual welfare levels that will form the basis of the social welfare evaluation of tax reforms. 
The estimates of the common utility function are given in Section 4. 
3. Labour supply elasticities 
In this section we report wage and income elasticities of labour supply both to illustrate the 
behavioural implications of the microeconometric model and because they are useful for the 
understanding and the interpretation of the optimal taxation results that will be presented in Section 6.  
  The wage elasticities are computed by means of stochastic simulation. Wage rates are 
incremented by 1%. Draws are made from the distributions related to preferences and opportunities. 
Given the responses of each individual, we aggregate them to compute the aggregate elasticities. 
Tables 3.1 and 3.2 display these elasticities. Since many individuals in this labour supply model of 
discrete choice will not react to small exogenous changes, the elasticities in Tables 3.1 and 3.2 have 
been computed as an average of the percentage changes in labour supply from a 10 percent increase in 
the wage rates.  7 
Table 3.1. Labour supply elasticities with respect to wage for single females, single males, 
married females and married males by deciles of household disposable income
*. 
Norway 1994 
  Female elasticities  Male elasticities 











I  0.59    0.00   
II  0.45    0.00   
III-VII  0.06    0.06   
IV  0.00    0.00   
Elasticity of the 
probability of 
participation 
X  0.00    0.00   
I  -0.17    0.77   
II  -0.04    0.00   
III-VII  -0.08    -0.08   
IV  -0.07    0.00   
Elasticity of the 
conditional expectation 
of total supply of hours 
X  0.00    0.00   
I  0.42    0.77   
II  0.42    0.00   
III-VII  -0.02    -0.02   
IV  -0.07    0.00   
Single females and 
males 
Elasticity of the 
unconditional 
expectation of total 
supply of hours 
X  0.00    0.00   
I  1.03  -0.28  0.90  -0.23 
II  0.35  -0.14  0.79  0.00 
III-VII  0.14  -0.23  0.13  -0.10 
IV  0.12  -0.12  0.06  -0.06 
Elasticity of the 
probability of 
participation 
X  0.07  0.00  0.06  -0.19 
I  1.51  -0.01  0.87  0.11 
II  0.62  -0.53  0.38  -0.08 
III-VII  0.27  -0.24  0.18  -0.14 
IV  0.08  -0.22  0.02  -0.09 
Elasticity of the 
conditional expectation 
of total supply of hours 
X  0.19  -0.10  -0.02  -0.23 
I  2.54  -0.29  1.77  -0.12 
II  0.97  -0.67  1.17  -0.08 
III-VII  0.41  -0.47  0.31  -0.24 
IV  0.20  -0.34  0.08  -0.14 
Married/cohabitating 
females and males 
Elasticity of the 
unconditional 
expectation of total 
supply of hours 





The third and the sixth panel of Table 3.1 and third and sixth column of Table 3.2 give the 
unconditional elasticities of labour supply, which means that both the impact on participation and 
hours supplied is accounted for.  
  Table 3.1 demonstrates that all own wage elasticities of married females and married males 
(except for the upper decile) are positive, whereas single females and males located in the central part 
of the income distribution will respond weakly negative to a wage increase. Second, we observe that 
almost all cross wage elasticities are negative due to the income effect. Thus, an increase in, say, the 
wage rate for males implies that the labour supply of his spouse goes down. The negative cross wage 
elasticities means that an overall wage increase give far weaker impact on labour supply, both for 
males and females, than partial wage increase for the two gender. For couples belonging to the ninth 
decile of the couples' income distribution this counteracting effect is so strong that labour supply of 
these couples’s declines from an overall wage increase. From the first two rows in each of the panels 
of Table 3.1 we observe that the labour supply of the 10-20 percent poorest are far more responsive to 
changes in economic incentives than the 10-20 percent richest. For single females and males in the 3-8 
deciles of their corresponding income distributions we observe backward bending labour supply 
curves as income effects dominate over substitution effects. By comparing the fourth and fifth panel of 
Table 3.1 we see for married/cohabitating females that hours supplied (given participation), in 
particular for those belonging to the poorest couples, is by far more responsive than participation. This 
result is a reflection of the flexibility of the Norwegian labour market, where jobs with part-time 
working hours are rather common. Moreover, rather generous maternity leave arrangements and high 
coverage of and subsidized kindergartens makes it is attractive for women to combine the raising of 
children and participation in labour market activities. By contrast, for single females we find that 
participation increases when wages increase, whereas hours supplied (given participation) decrease. A 
similar, but weaker, effect is found for single males with medium high incomes.  
 9 
Table 3.2. Aggregate labour supply elasticities with respect to wage for single and married 
individuals. Norway 1994 
Female elasticities  Male elasticities 
Family 
status 








Elasticity of the probability of 
participation 
0.12    0.04   
Elasticity of the conditional 
expectation of total supply of 
hours 




Elasticity of the unconditional 
expectation of total supply of 
hours 
0.02    0.02   
Elasticity of the probability of 
participation 
0.21  -0.19  0.23  -0.11 
Elasticity of the conditional 
expectation of total supply of 
hours 
0.31  -0.23  0.16  -0.13  Married 
females 
and males 
Elasticity of the unconditional 
expectation of total supply of 
hours 
0.52  -0.42  0.39  -0.23 
 
The major feature of the estimated labour supply elasticities can be summarized as follows: (a) labour 
supply of married women is far more elastic than for married men; (b) individuals belonging to low-
income households are much more elastic than individuals belonging to high-income households. As 
demonstrated by the review of Røed and Strøm (2002) these findings are consistent with the findings 
in many recent studies.  The sharp decline in elasticities with respect to income suggests that marginal 
tax rates on low and average income should be reduced, which is in conflict with the widespread 
opinion that - at least for efficiency purposes - the marginal tax rate profile on personal income should 
be flattened and the tax rates on higher incomes should be reduced. However, the design of an optimal 
system will of course depend on the trade-off between efficiency and equality exhibited by the chosen 
social welfare function and will be further discussed in the next sections.  
  To complement the information provided by the wage elasticities Tables 3.3 and 3.4 display 
information for income elasticities. Non-labour income comprises several income categories, which 
are unevenly distributed among households and do not change uniformly in our simulation 
experiments. Since the income elasticities are household-specific, the aggregate labour supply 
response to a shift that involves changes in non-labour income, is the result of a complex calculation. 
The simulations with respect to capital income and cash transfers are unevenly affected by the general 
economic growth and the tax rate adjustments. Table 3.4 shows how the elasticity of labour supply 10 
with respect to changes in these income categories depends on gender, household type and location in 
the income distribution.  
 
Table. 3.3.  Labour supply elasticities with respect to non-labour income for single females, 
single males, married females and married males by deciles of household disposable 
income. Norway 1994 
  Female elasticities  Male elasticities 





















I  -0.59  0.59  -0.59  0  0  0 
II  0  0  0  0  0  0 
III-VII  -0.71  -0.13  -0.64  -0.12  -0.12  -0.06 
IV  -1.38  -0.34  -1.38  -0.33  0  -0.33 
Elasticity of the 
probability of 
participation 
X  -1.33  -1.00  -1.00  -0.83  -0.83  0 
I  0.43  -0.16  0.43  0  0  0 
II  0  0  0  0  0  0 
III-VII  0.08  0.02  0.09  0.05  0.05  0.05 
IV  -0.21  -0.04  -0.21  0.05  0  0.05 
Elasticity of the 
conditional 
expectation of total 
supply of hours 
X  -0.51  0.16  -0.47  -0.42  0.01  -0.40 
I  -0.18  0.42  -0.18  0  0  0 
II  0  0  0  0  0  0 
III-VII  -0.63  -0.11  -0.56  -0.07  -0.07  -0.01 




Elasticity of the 
unconditional 
expectation of total 
supply of hours 
X  -1.81  -0.86  -1.42  -1.22  -0.82  -0.40 
I  0  0  0  0  0  0 
II  0  0  0  0.07  0.14  0.07 
III-VII  -0.16  -0-06  -0.11  -0.17  -0.17  -0.10 
IV  -0.23  -0.12  0  -0.46  -0.29  -0.17 
Elasticity of the 
probability of 
participation 
X  -0.81  -0.54  -0.27  -0.82  -0.57  -0.25 
I  0  0  0  0  0  0 
II  -0.05  -0.10  -0.10  -0.08  0.01  -0.12 
III-VII  -0.05  0.01  -0.03  -0.03  0  -0.03 
IV  -0.14  -0.06  0  -0.01  -0.01  0.03 
Elasticity of the 
conditional 
expectation of total 
supply of hours 
X  -0.22  -0.22  0.10  -0.32  -0.13  -0.13 
I  0  0  0  0  0  0 
II  -0.05  -010  -0.10  -0.01  0.16  -0.04 
III-VII  -0.21  -0.05  -0.13  -0.20  -0.07  -0.13 




Elasticity of the 
unconditional 
expectation of total 
supply of hours 
X  -1.01  -0.75  -0.17  -1.11  -0.69  -0.38 
. 
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Table 3.4. Aggregate labour supply elasticities with respect to non-labour income for single and 
married individuals. Norway 1994 
Female elasticities  Male elasticities 
Family 
status  Type of elasticity 
Non-labour 
income (cap. 
















Elasticity of the probability of 
participation  -0.79  -0.20  -0.71  -0.19  0  -0.08 
Elasticity of the conditional 




Elasticity of the unconditional 
expectation of total supply of hours  -0.89  -0.23  -0.77  -0.23  -0.16  -0.09 
-0.20  -0.11  -0.09  -0.23  -0.12  -0.10  Elasticity of the probability of 
participation 
Elasticity of the conditional 
expectation of total supply of hours 




Elasticity of the unconditional 
expectation of total supply of hours  -0.30  -0.15  -0.11  -0.32  -0.16  -0.15 
 
4. The framework of the social planner 
Since the microeconomic model that is used in this study allows variation in preferences for leisure 
and comsumption and moreover some individuals live as singles whereas others form families and live 
together it does not make sense to treat the estimated utility functions as comparable individual 
welfare functions. Thus, it is required to introduce measures of individual welfare that justify 
interpersonal comparisons. Section 4.1 explains the method used for dealing with this problem, 
whereas Section 4.2 discusses the methods that will be used for aggregating individual welfare levels. 
 
4.1. Specification and estimation of individual welfare functions 
As is universally recognized a social planner needs to compare gains in welfare of some to losses in 
welfare of others as part of the evaluation of a tax reform. It is non-controversial to assume that each 
individual's welfare increases with increasing income and leisure as is also captured by the household-
specific utility functions. However, since the preferences as specified in the behavioural model are 
heterogeneous and moreover we include in the sample both singles and couples, we face the problem 
of interpersonal comparability when the household utilities are assumed to represent individual 
welfare levels
5. To solve the comparability problem the social planner may treat all individuals as 
                                                 
5 See Boadway et al. (2002) and Fleurbaey and Maniquet (2006) for a discussion of interpersonal comparability of utility 
when preferences for leisure differ between individuals. 
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singles and introduce an individual welfare function (a common utility function) where we adjust for 
scale economies in consumption by dividing couples' income by the square root of 2. Each of the two 
adult partners is assumed to enjoy the resulting income (y). The formal definition of the individual 
welfare function (V) determined by the social planner is given by 

































  Since the chosen combinations of leisure and disposable income depends on the availability 
of various job opportunities, we use a similar method for determining the parameters of the individual 
welfare functions as the one used for determining the parameters of the utility functions for singles and 
couples. Thus, expression (2.4), where the systematic part of the utility function (v) is replaced by the 
individual welfare function (V) will form the basis for estimating the parameters of V defined by (4.1). 
Note, however, that the previously estimated distributions of offered hours and wages will be inserted 
for p in (2.4). In this context the intuition behind equation (2.4) is that the proportion of the population 
with disposable income y and leisure  ( ) 18736 Lh =-  can be expressed as the welfare value of (y,L), 
weighted by a measure p of how available this income-leisure combination is. The estimated 
parameters for the individual welfare functions are reported in Table 4.1. 
 
Table 4.1. Estimates of the parameters of the welfare functions for individuals 20 – 62 years old, 
Norway 1994 
Variable  Parameter  Estimate  Stand.dev. 
Income after tax (y)       
  1 g   -0.649  0.086   
 
2 g   3.026  0.138 
Leisure (L)       
 
3 g   -12.262  0.556 
 
4 g   0.045  0.011 
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The results in Table 4.1 demonstrate that the curvature parameters of the income and leisure terms are 
statistically significant and make these terms increasing concave.  
4.2. Social Welfare Functions 
The informational structure of the individual welfare functions defined by (4.1) allows comparisoin of 
welfare gains and losses of different individuals due to a policy change. When evaluating the 
distribution of individual welfare effects of a tax system and/or a tax reform it is required to 
summarize the gains and losses by a social welfare function. The simplest welfare function is the one 
that adds up the comparable welfare gains (V defined by (4.1)) over individuals. The objection to the 
linear additive welfare function is that the individuals are given equal welfare weights, independent of 
whether they are poor or rich. Concern for distributive justice requires, however, that poor individuals 
are assigned larger welfare weights than rich individuals. This structure is captured by the following 







- == ￿  
where F
-1 is the left inverse of the cumulative distribution function of the individual welfare levels V 
with mean m, and pk(t) is a weight function defined by 
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Note that the inequality aversion exhibited by Wk decreases with increasing k. As  , k kW ﬁ¥  







¥ == ￿ . 
It follows by straightforward calculations that  k W m £  for all j and that Wk is equal to the mean  m for 
finite k if and only if F is the egalitarian distribution. Thus, Wk can be interpreted as the equally 
distributed individual welfare level. As recognized by Yaari (1988) this property suggests that Ik, 
defined by  
                                                 
6 This famiy has its origin form Mehran (1976) and Yaari (1988). Several other authors have discussed rationales for rank-
dependent measures of inequality and social welfare, see e.g. Sen (1974), Hey and Lambert (1980), Donaldson and Weymark 








can be used as a summary measure of inequality and moreover is a member of the “illfare-ranked 
single-series Ginis” class introduced by Donaldson and Weymark (1980). As noted by Aaberge 
(2000), I1 is actually equivalent to a measure of inequality that was proposed by Bonferroni (1930), 
whilst I2 is the Gini coefficient.
7 In this paper we will measure individual welfare level with a common 
utility function (see Section 4). 
  To ease the interpretation of the inequality aversion profiles exhibited by W1, W2, W3 and W¥  
Table 4.2 provides ratios of the corresponding weights – as defined by (4.4) – of the median individual 
and the 5 per cent poorest, the 30 per cent poorest and the 5 per cent richest individual for different 
social welfare criteria. As can be observed from the weight profiles provided by Table 4.2 W1 will be 
particular sensitive to changes in policies that affect the welfare of the poor. 
 
Table 4.2. Distributional weight profiles of four different social welfare functions  




W3  W¥  
(Utilitarian) 
p(.05)/p(.5)  4,32  1,90  1,33  1 
p(.30)/p(.5)  1,74  1,40  1,21  1 
p(.95)/p(.5)  0,07  0,10  0,13  1 
 
  For a given total welfare (i.e. the sum of individual welfare levels) the welfare functions W1, 
W2, and W3 take their maximum value when everyone receives the same income and may thus be 
interpreted as Equality-of-Outcome criteria (EO) when employed as a measure for evaluating tax 
systems.  
  However, as indicated by Roemer (1998) the EO criterion is controversial and suffers from 
the drawback of receiving little support among citizens in a nation.
8 This is due to the fact that 
differences in outcomes resulting from differences in efforts are, by many, considered ethically 
acceptable and thus should not be the target of a redistribution policy. An egalitarian redistribution 
policy should instead seek to equalize those differentials in individual welfare arising from factors 
beyond the control of the individual. Thus, not only the outcome, but its origin and how it was 
obtained, matters. This is the essential idea behind Roemer’s (1998) theory of equality of opportunity, 
                                                 
7 For further discussion of the family {Ik : k=1, 2, ...} of inequality measures we refer to Mehran (1976), Donaldson and 
Weymark (1980, 1983), Bossert (1990) and Aaberge (2000, 2001). 
8 See also Dworkin (1981a, 1981b), Arneson (1989, 1990), Cohen (1989) and Roemer (1993).  15 
where people are supposed to differ with respect to circumstances, which are attributes of the 
environment of the individual that influence her earning potential, and which are “beyond her control”. 
This concept is interesting from the policy point-of-view, since the majority of citizens in most 
industrialized countries, although not unfavourable to redistribution, seem sensitive to the way that a 
certain outcome has been attained. Redistribution is more likely to receive support if it is designed to 
correct circumstances that are beyond people’s control (i.e. opportunities). On the other hand, if a bad 
outcome is associated with a lack of effort, redistribution would be much less acceptable
9.  
  This study defines circumstances by family background, and classifies the individuals into 
three types according to father’s years of education:  
•  less than 5 years (Type 1),  
•  5-8 years (Type 2), and 
•  more than 8 years (Type 3).  
  Assume that 
1() j Ft
-  is the welfare level of the individual located at the t
th quantile of the 
income distribution (Fj) of type j. The differences in welfare levels within each type are assumed to be 
due to different degrees of effort for which the individual is to be held responsible, whereas welfare 
differences that may be traced back to family background are considered to be beyond the control of 
the individual. As indicated by Roemer (1998) this suggests that we may measure a person’s effort by 
the quantile of the welfare distribution where he is located. Next, Roemer declares that two individuals 
in different types have expended the same degree of effort if they have identical positions (rank) in the 
welfare distribution of their type. Thus, an EOp (Equality of Opportunity) tax policy should aim at 
designing a tax system such that 
1 min() j Ft
- is maximized for each quantile t. However, since this 
criterion is rather demanding and in most cases will not produce a complete ordering of the tax 
systems under consideration a weaker ranking criterion is required. To this end Roemer (1998) 









Thus,  W¥ %  ignores income differences within types and is solely concerned about differences that arise 
from differential circumstances. By contrast, the EO criteria defined by (4.3) does not distinguish 
between the different sources that contribute to welfare inequality. As an alternative to (4.3) and (4.7) 
we introduce the following extended family of EOp welfare functions, 
                                                 
9 Boadway et al. (2002) provide an alternative contribution that deals with the design of the optimal tax system when the 
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where pk(t) is defined by (4.4). 
  The essential difference between  k W %  and W¥ %  is that  k W %  gives increasing weight to the 
welfare of lower quantiles in the type-distributions. In this respect  k W %  captures also an aspect of 
inequality within types. Thus, as apposed to W¥ % the weighted EOp criterion  k W %  might account for the 
effect of circumstances beyond what is captured by fathers' level of education. As explained above, the 
concern for within type inequality is greatest for the most disadvantaged type, i.e. for the type that 
forms the largest segment(s) of  [ ] { }
1 min():0,1 j j
Ftt
- ˛ . 
  Note that 
1 min() i i
Ft
-  defines the inverse of the following cumulative distribution function 
( ) F % , 
(4.9)  ( ) ( ) ( )
11 ()Pr()Prmin()11(), ii i
i
FxFTxFTxFx
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where T is a random variable with uniform distribution function (defined on [0,1]). Thus, we may 
decompose the EOp welfare functions  k W %  in the same way as with the EOp welfare functions Wk. 
Accordingly, we have that 
(4.10)  ( ) 1,1,2,... kk WWIk ¥ =-= %%% , 











is a summary measure of inequality for the mixture distribution  F % . 
  Expression (4.10) shows that the EOp welfare functions  k W %  for k <¥ take into account 
value judgments about the trade-off between the mean income and the inequality in the distribution of 
welfare for the most EOp disadvantaged people. Thus,  k W %  may be considered as an inequality within 
type adjusted version of the pure EOp welfare function that was introduced by Roemer (1998). As 
explained above, the concern for within type inequality is greatest for the most disadvantaged type, i.e. 
for the type that forms the largest segment(s) of the mixture distribution  F % . Alternatively,  k W %  for 17 
k <¥ may be interpreted as an EOp welfare function that, in contrast to W¥ % , gives increasing weight 
to individuals who occupy low effort quantiles. 
  Note that the EOp criterion was originally interpreted as more acceptable￿from the point of 
view of individualistic-conservative societies. Our extended EOp welfare functions can be considered 
as a mixture of the EO welfare functions and the pure EOp welfare function; they are concerned about 
inequality between types as well as inequality within the worst-off  F % distribution defined by (4.9). 
EOp looks at what happens to the distribution formed by the most disadvantaged segments of the 
intersecting type-specific distributions (defined by (4.9)). Moreover, the pure version of the criterion 
only looks at the mean of the worst-off distribution. By contrast, EO takes into account the whole 
income distribution. For a given sum of incomes, EO will consider equality of welfare (everyone 
attains the same level of welfare) as the most desirable welfare distribution. The pure EOp will instead 
consider equality in mean welfare across types as the ultimate goal. Since the extended EOp combines 
these two criteria, transfers that reduce the differences in the mean welfare between types as well as 
the welfare differentials between the individuals within the worst-off distribution are considered 
equalizing by the extended EOp. Thus, in the case of a fixed total welfare also the extended EOp will 
consider equality of income as the most desirable distribution. However, by transferring money from 
the most advantaged type to the most disadvantaged type, EOp inequality may be reduced although 
transfers may be conflicting with the Pigou-Dalton transfer principle. Whether it is more “efficient” to 
reduce inequality between or within types depends on the specific situation. When labour supply 
responses to taxation are taken into account the composition of types in the worst-off distribution will 
change and depend on the chosen welfare function  ( ) k W %  as well as on the considered tax rule. Thus, 
the large heterogeneity in labour supply responses to tax changes that is captured by our model(s) 
makes it impossible to state anything on EOp- or EO-optimality before the simulation exercises have 
been completed. 
5. Optimal tax rules 
The purpose of this section is to present an exercise where we locate the optimal tax rules given a 
fixed total net tax revenue, from the point of view of EO and EOp criteria. To this end we employ the 
labour supply model and simulation framework explained in Section 2 and in the Appendix to 
simulate the labour supply behaviour of single females, single males, and couples that are between 20 
and 62 years old. To capture the heterogeneity in preferences we have estimated simultaneously three 
separate utility functions: one for single females, one for single males and one for couples. 18 
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where y is net available income,  Z is gross income,  E is the exemption level,  ( ) 123 ,, ttt  are the 
marginal tax rates applied to the three brackets of income above the exemption level,  1 Z  is the upper 
limit of the first bracket and 2 Z is the upper limit of the second bracket. Thus, each particular tax rule is 
characterized by the six parameters:  E ,  1 t ,  2 t ,  3 t ,  1 Z  and  2 Z . 
  The tax rule specified by (5.1) replaces the current rule as of 1994, which is described by the 
example of Table 5.1 and also belongs to the class of piece-wise linear tax rules. In this paper we 
focus on the profile of the marginal tax rates. Therefore we keep unchanged under the alternative tax 




Table 5.1.  Current tax rule in Norway as of 1994 for singles without children and couples 
without children and with two wage earners 
Gross income (NOK 1994)  Tax 
(0 – 17000)  0 
(17000 – 24709)  0.25Y - 4250 
(24709 – 28250)  0.078Y   
(28250 – 140500)  0.302Y - 6328 
(140500 – 208000)  0.358Y  - 14196 
(208000 – 234500)  0.453Y - 33956 
(234500 – )  0.495Y - 43804 
 
  The identification of the optimal tax rules consists of five steps: 
                                                 
10 In previous exercise – not reported here – we  also simulated tax rules that included a positive transfer (on top of current 
welfare transfers) and it turned out that the optimal transfer was zero or very low, depending on the social welfare criterion. 19 
1.  The tax rule is applied to individual earners’ gross incomes in order to obtain disposable incomes 
(income after tax) corresponding to each alternative in the choice set
11. New labour supply 
responses in view of a new tax rule are simulated by the household labour supply model.  
2.  To each decision maker (wife or husband) between 20 and 62 years old, an equivalent income(y) is 
imputed, computed as total disposable household income (c) divided by the square root of the 
number of household members. The purpose of this procedure is to convert the distribution of 
incomes (c) across heterogeneous families into a distribution of (equivalent) incomes (y) across 
adult individuals.  
3.  As a result of the previous steps, we now have for each individual a simulated pair (y, h). We then 
compute the individual welfare levels by applying to the chosen (y, h) the individual welfare 
(common utility) function (see Section 4). 
4.  We then compute  k W  and  k W %  for  1,2,3 k =  and ¥. 
5.  Optimization is performed by iterating the steps 1-4 in order to find the tax rule from the class 
(6.1) that produces the highest value of  k W  or  k W %  for each value of k, under the constraint of 
constant total tax revenue. In fact we perform two optimization exercises. In the first one, all the 
tax parameters are unconstrained. This always results in 3 1 t =
12. Since in practice a 100 per cent 
maximum marginal tax rate could hardly be implemented, we perform a second exercise where  3 t  
is constrained to be not grater than 0.60. 












                                                 
11 We also account for the fact that couples with one wage earner face milder taxation in the sense that all tax brackets above 
the second bracket in Table 6.1 are widened. 
12 Notice that in our model it is possible that an individual optimizes in the range of income values where the 100% marginal 
tax rate is applied, since utility does not only depend on income and hours of work but also on other unobserved job 
characteristics captured by the stochastic component e.  20 
Table 5.2 Optimal tax rules according to alternative social welfare criteria
(*) 
  EO-social welfare  EOp-social welfare 




W3  W¥  
(Utilitarian) 
1
~ W  
(Bonferroni) 
2
~ W  
(Gini) 




1 t   0.16  0.22  0.22  0.22  0.14  0.17  0.17  0.20 
2 t   0.37  0.37  0.36  0.33  0.39  0.36  0.35  0.33 
3 t   1.00  1.00  1.00  1.00  1.00  1.00  1.00  1.00 
E  1.00  22.00  18.00  11.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
1 Z   161.80  217.85  234.88  272.10  148.53  173.61  169.42  237.72 
2 Z   730.00  720.00  720.00  780.00  730.00  720.00  710.00  730.00 
(*) E,  1 Z and  2 Z are measured in thousands of 1994 NOK  21 
 
Table 5.3   Optimal tax rules according to alternative social welfare criteria
(*). ( 3 t constrained 
to be £  0.6 ) 
  EO-social welfare  EOp-social welfare 




W3  W¥  
(Utilitarian) 
1
~ W  
(Bonferroni) 
2
~ W  
(Gini) 




1 t   0.17  0.20  0.23  0.22  0.15  0.17  0.20  0.21 
2 t   0.38  0.37  0.37  0.33  0.39  0.36  0.37  0.34 
3 t   0.60  0.60  0.60  0.60  0.60  0.60  0.60  0.60 
E  0.00  6.00  20.00  8.00  0.00  0.00  2.00  2.00 
1 Z   172.00  210.97  243.98  263.70  151.81  164.52  226.62  255.87 
2 Z   700.00  690.00  690.00  720.00  710.00  680.00  680.00  670.00 
(*) E,  1 Z and  2 Z are measured in thousands of 1994 NOK  
 
Tables 5.2 and 5.3 display the optimal tax systems from the unconstrained and the constrained 
optimization exercise. To ease the comparability of the 1994 tax system and the various optimal tax 
systems we report average taxes for a selection of gross incomes in Table 5.4. Tables 5.5 and 5.6 
illustrate some of the behavioural implications of the optimal tax rules. Table 5.7 displays the 
percentages of winners under the optimal rule by income deciles of the 1994 income distribution.  
Figures 5.1(a), 5.1(b), 5.2(a) and 5.2(b) are limited to the EO-optimal tax rules since the EOp-optimal 
ones are very similar.   
a)  The tables and the graphs show that the more egalitarian the criterion is, the more progressive 
is the optimal tax rule. For example the optimal rule according to Bonferroni is more 
progressive than the optimal rule according to Gini, which in turn is more progressive than the 
optimal utilitarian rule. 
b)  The differences implied by using the EO or the corresponding EOp criteria seem negligible. 
This is interesting since EOp is usually interpreted as a less interventionist criterion than EO. 
Still, when empirically implemented they both seem to require very similar tax rules, even 
slightly more progressive the one implied by EOp.   
c)  Overall, the structure of the optimal rules is not dramatically different from the current rule; 
all the rules envisage a smooth sequence of increasing marginal tax rates. The optimal rules 
would imply a 100% marginal tax rate on very high incomes, but the proportion of households 
falling in the corresponding income bracket is very low; around 1.7 percent for married/cohab. 22 
males, 0.5 percent for married/cohabiting females, 1.4 percent for single males and 0 for 
single females. 
d)  There are however also two important differences between the current and the optimal rules. 
First, all the optimal rules imply a higher income after tax for most levels of gross income. In 
other words, the optimal rules are able to extract the same total tax revenue from a larger total 
gross income (i.e. applying a lower average tax rate). The result is due to a sufficiently high 
labour supply response estimated and accounted for by the model.  Second, the optimal 
marginal tax rates applied to average or low-average income brackets are markedly lower than 
the ones implied by the current tax rule. This result provides a controversial perspective in 
view of the tax reforms implemented in many developed countries during the last decades. In 
most cases those reforms embodied the idea of improving efficiency and labour supply 
incentives through a lower average tax rate and lower marginal tax rates on higher incomes.
13 
Our optimal tax computations give support to the first part (lowering the average tax rate), 
much less to the second; on the contrary our results suggest that a lower average tax rate 
should be obtained by lowering the marginal tax rates particularly on low and average income 
brackets
14.  
e)  The differences between the current and the optimal tax rules have important behavioural 
implications. All the optimal rules imply a larger labour supply and disposable income 
(income after tax) (Table 5.5).
15 Since we keep unchanged the total tax revenue also the gross 
income is larger under the optimal rules. This is due to the fact that the optimal rules induce 
(some of) the households to move to alternatives with longer hours and/or higher wages.  
Table 5.6 shows that the strongest labour supply response comes from households in the lower 
income deciles, who are those who show a more elastic labour supply (Section 3). Table 5.7 
shows the percentage of winners under the optimal rules, by marital status, gender and 
household income decile under the current 1994 rule, where an individual is defined as a 
winner if her/his welfare is higher under the new tax rule than under the current 1994 rule. All 
the optimal rules would “win the referendum” against the current rule, since they all imply a 
strong majority of winners. The percentage of winners, however, varies substantially across 
the different demographic subgroups. 
                                                 
13 For example Blundell (1996) reports that during the 80’s and early 90’s in some countries the top marginal tax rates were 
cut from 70-80% down to about 40-50%. On these issues the discussion in Røed and Strøm (2001) is especially relevant. 
14 A second important difference between our exercise and the implemented reforms referred to in the main text, is that those 
reforms typically envisaged a reduction of the total tax revenue together with the reduction in the average tax rate, while in 
our simulations we keep the total tax revenue unchanged.  
15 The (simulated) 1994 levels of participation, hours of work and income are reported in the Appendix. 23 
Table 5.4. Average taxes under the 1994 tax system and various optimal tax systems when the 


















50 000  17.5  17.0  18.5  15.0  20.2 
100 000  23.9  17.0  20.2  15.0  20.6 
150 000  26.3  17.0  20.8  15.0  20.7 
200 000  28.7  19.9  21.1  20.8  20.8 
300 000  34.9  26.0  22.7  26.9  22.8 
400 000  38.5  29.0  25.3  29.9  25.6 
500 000  40.7  30.8  26.8  31.7  27.3 
700 000  43.2  32.8  28.6  33.8  29.9 
1000 000  45.1  41.0  37.5  41.4  39.2 
* The tax reates concern singles without children and married/cohabiting persons living in families with two wage earners. 
 
Table 5.5   Percentage changes in participation rates, annual hours of work and disposable 
income under the EO-optimal tax rules ( 3 t constrained to be £  0.6) 
  EO-social welfare  EOp-social welfare 








W ¥  
(Utilitarian)
1
~ W  
(Bonferroni) 
2 % W  
(Gini) 
 
3 % W   ¥ W ~
 
(Utilitarian)
Participation rates  4.5 4.9 4.5 4.9 3.4 4.5 4.9 4.9
Annual hours  7.0 7.5 7.4 8.9 5.4 7.0 8.2 8.7
Single 
males 
Disposable income  11.2 11.8 11.8 14.7 9.5 11.2 12.5 14.1
                            
Participation rates  4.7 6.7 6.3 7.5 3.9 4.7 7.1 7.5
Annual hours  6.1 9.7 9.3 12.1 4.3 6.1 11.0 12.2
Sigle 
females 
Disposable income  4.3 6.6 6.3 8.7 3.0 4.3 7.6 8.9
                            
Participation rates, M 2.2 2.7 2.8 3.5 1.9 2.5 2.9 3.4
Participation rates, F 2.7 2.4 1.9 1.4 2.7 2.6 2.5 1.9
Annual hours, M  6.4 7.8 8.4 11.6 5.1 7.2 8.8 11.1
Annual hours, F  6.2 7.0 5.4 5.5 5.5 5.7 7.1 6.2
Couples 
Disposable income  8.7 10.7 11.0 14.6 7.1 9.7 11.5 14.224 
Table 5.6   Percentage changes in labour supply (total hours) by household income decile under 
the EO-optimal tax rules ( 3 t constrained to be £  0.6) 







W ¥  
(Utilitarian) 





Male  Female  Male  Female  Male  Female  Male  Female 
I  89.5  65.9  97.9   83.6   95.7   62.2   108.4   97.8  
II  17.9  25.2        22.7         36.8         19.6         36,8         26.2         44.1  
III-VIII  2.8  3.0         2.8          6.5          3.1          7.4          3.2          8.9  
IX  0.0  0.0        0.0         0.0         0.0         0.0          2.5         -0.4  







All  7.0  6.1         7.5          9.7          7.4          9.3          8.9          12.1  
                   
I  36.3   47.8   43.8   54.1   42.0   55.7   54.3   61.7  
II        22.9         13.4         29.1         17.4         32.0         12.5         42.3         16.3  
III-VIII         4.2          4.6          5.0          4.7          5.9          2.7          8.6          1.9  
IX         1.5         -0.2          1.7        0.0          1.3        0.4         1.7         0.0  



















Table 5.7. Percentage of winners under the EO-optimal tax rules ( 3 t constrained to be £  0.6) 
 
    W1 
(Bonferroni) 
W2 




W ¥  
(Utilitarian) 





Male  Female  Male  Female  Male  Female  Male  Female 
I  0.74  0.74  0.74  0.74  0.74  0.71  0.61  0.74 
II  0.68  0.55  0.61  0.55  0.61  0.55  0.52  0.48 
III-VIII  0.83  0.69  0.81  0.68  0.78  0.68  0.72  0.65 
IX  0.77  0.42  0.84  0.48  0.84  0.48  0.84  0.55 




All  0.79  0.62  0.79  0.63  0.78  0.62  0.71  0.62 
                   
I  0.62  0.63  0.62  0.63  0.61  0.63  0.59  0.62 
II  0.70  0.70  0.70  0.70  0.68  0.69  0.68  0.71 
III-VIII  0.79  0.82  0.80  0.83  0.79  0.83  0.78  0.84 
IX  0.80  0.83  0.83  0.86  0.84  0.86  0.88  0.90 





















We have performed an exercise in designing optimal income taxes that – differently from what is 
typically done in the literature – does not rely on a priori theoretical optimal taxation results, but 
instead use a microeconometric model of labour supply in order to directly maximize a social welfare 
function with respect to a parametrically defined income tax rule. The microeconometric model can be 
considered as an extension of the standard multinomial logit model, and is designed to allow for a 
detailed description of complex choice sets and budget constraints. This model differs from the 
traditional marginal criteria models of labor supply in several respects. First, it accounts for observed 
as well as unobserved heterogeneity in tastes and allows for constraints in the choice of hours of work. 
Second, it includes both single person households and married/cohabiting couples and allows for 
simultaneous treatment of both spouses choices. Third, the model allows for an exact representation of 
income taxes. The model, which contains 78 parameters that capture the heterogeneity in preferences 
as well as in opportunities among households and individuals, is estimated on the basis of Norwegian 
micro data from 1995. The estimated model is for a given tax rule used to simulate the choices made 
by single individuals and couples. Those choices are therefore generated by preferences and 
opportunities that vary across the decision units. We identify optimal tax rules – within a class of 6-
parameter piece-wise linear rules - by iteratively running the model until the social welfare function is 
maximized under the constraint of keeping constant the total net tax revenue. 
  We focus on the profile of the marginal tax rates and keep fixed the current (1994) system of 
transfers, income support and social assistance policies. We explore a variety of different social 
welfare criteria. More egalitarian social welfare function tends to imply more progressive tax rules. 
The two alternative social welfare criteria, EO and EOp do not seem to entail major differences in the 
corresponding optimal tax rules. A first striking result is that, irrespective of the social welfare 
criterion used, the top optimal marginal tax rate always turns out to be 100 per cent for sufficiently 
high gross income levels (approximately above 700 000 Norwegian Kroner (1994) »87 000 Euros). 
Second, all the optimal tax rules imply an average tax rate lower than the current 1994 one. Third, all 
the optimal rules imply – with respect to the current rule – lower marginal rates on low and/or average 
income levels and higher marginal rates on sufficiently high income levels. The pattern of labour 
supply elasticities illustrated in Section 3 contributes to explaining the profile of the optimal tax rules. 
Our results are partially at odds with the tax reforms that took place in many countries during the last 
decades. While those reforms embodied the idea of lowering average tax rates, the way to implement 
it has typically consisted in reducing the top marginal rates. Our results instead suggest lower average 
tax rates by reducing marginal rates on low and average income levels and increasing marginal rates 
on very high income levels.                          29 
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The microeconometric model - Empirical specification and 
estimation results 
The modelling approach of this paper differs from the traditional textbook model by treating the utility 
function as a random variable and analyzing labour supply as a random utility maximization problem. 
This framework can be considered as an extension of the standard multinomial logit model; see 
Dagsvik (1994) and Aaberge et al. (1999) for further details. For the sake of completeness we give a 
brief outline of this modelling framework. 
 
To account for the fact that single individuals and married couples may face different choice sets and 
exhibit different preferences over income and leisure we estimate separate models for single females 
and males and married couples. 
A.1. Single females and males 
The utility functions for single females and males is assumed to be of the following form 
(A1)  ( ) (,),,(,,) UfwhIhsvhwse =  
where 
w = wage rate 
h = hours of work 
I = exogenous income 
s= 1 if the job belongs to the Public Sector (= 0 otherwise), 
( ) , fwhI  is disposable income (income after tax) measured in 100 000 NOK  
and e follows a Type III extreme value distribution.  
  The systematic part is specified as follows 
(A2)    
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L is leisure, defined as  ( ) 18736 Lh =- ,  33 
A is age,  
C1, C2, and C3 are number of children below 3, between 3 and 6 and between 7 and 14 years old, 
respectively.  
  The a-parameters  are gender-specific.  
  The children terms are dropped in the utility function for single males since we observe very 
few children living with single males. 
  The stochastic componente  is assumed to be independently drawn from a Type IIII extreme 
value distribution. 
  The individuals maximize their utility by choosing among opportunities defined by hours of 
work, hourly wage and sector of employment. Opportunities with  0 h = (and  0 w= ) are non-market 
opportunities (i.e. alternative allocations of “leisure”). 
  We write the density of opportunities in sector s requiring h hours of work and paying hourly 
wage w  
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where p0 is the proportion of market opportunities in the opportunity set, g1s, g2s and  3 g  are 
respectively the densities of hours, wages, and opportunities in sector S, conditional upon the 
opportunity being a market job.  
  Given the above assumption upon the stochastic component and upon the density of 















In view of the empirical specification it is convenient to divide both numerator and denominator by 











































for { } ,0 hw = . 
  Except for possible peaks corresponding to part time (pt, 18-20 weekly hours) and to full 
time (ft, 37-40 weekly hours) we assume that the distribution of offered hours is uniformly distributed. 
Thus, g1 is given by 
(A7) 
[ ]
( ) [ ]
[ ]































where w  is the maximum observed value of h. 
  Since the density values must add up to 1, we can also compute  s g  according to: 
  ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 1234 1712018)exp36214037exp411 s ss gppppw -+-++-+-++-= . 
We also specify: 
(A8)  ( ) 0312 ()exp(1) ggsss mm =+- . 
The above parameters p  and  m  vary by gender. In the tables we refer to p  and  m  as the parameters 
of the job opportunity density. 
  The density of offered wages is assumed to be lognormal with mean that depends on length 
of schooling (Ed) and on past potential working experience (Exp), where experience is defined to be 
equal to age minus length of schooling minus five, i.e. 
(A9) 
2
0123 log wExpExpEd bbbbsh =++++  
where h is standard normally distributed. The parameters b  vary by gender and sector of 
employment. 
  The estimation of the models for single individuals and married couples is based on data 
from the 1995 Survey of Level of Living. We have restricted the ages of the individuals to be between 35 
18 and 54 in order to minimize the inclusion in the sample of individuals who in principle are eligible 
for retirement, since analysis of retirement decisions is beyond the scope of this study. Table A4  
reports incomes, participation rates and hours of work observed in the sample. 
  The parameters appearing in expressions (A1)-(A5) are assumed to differ for single females 
and males. However, since the opportunity distributions (A3) and (A7)-(A9) concern married males 
and married females as well, the parameters of the separate utility functions and joint opportunity 
densities are estimated simultaneously by the method of maximum likelihood. The likelihood function 
is equal to the products of the labour supply densities for single females, single males and couples. 
The estimates of opportunity density parameters are reported in Table A3, whilst the preference 
parameters for single females and males and couples are reported in Tables A1 and A2, respectively. 
 
Table A1. Estimates of the parameters of the utility functions for single females and males. 
Norway 1994 
Single females  Single males 
Variable  Parameter 
Estimate  Std. Dev.  Estimate  Std. Dev. 
Consumption           
  a1  -0.59  0.28  0.24   0.33 
  a2  4.37  0.52  2.27   0.44 
Leisure           
  a3  0.65  0.92  0.76   0.99 
  a4  498.50  145.18  337.40   128.84 
Log age  a5  -265.77  79.22  -180.89   70.63 
Log age squared  a6  36.36  10.89  24.81   9.75 
# children, 0 – 2 years old   a7  3.62  2.43     
# children, 3 – 6 years old  a8  -0.36  7.87     
# children, 7 – 14 years old  a9  -2.24  1.42     
Employed in public sector   a10  -2.97  0.87  -2.20  0.90 
(Empl. in pub. sec.)(# child.,  
0 – 2 years old)   a11  -7.29  7.46     
(Empl. in pub. sec.)(# child.,  
3 – 6 years old)  a12  -1.02  2.10     
(Empl. in pub. sec.)(# child.,  
7 – 14 years old)  a13  1.15  1.10     
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A2. Married couples 
The labour supply model for married couples accounts for both spouses’ decisions through the 
following specification of the structural part of the utility function for couples 
(A10)
( )


































































 where the leisure Li  is defined as  ( ) 18736,, ii LhiFM =-= . We allow for sector- and gender-
specific job opportunities in accordance with the functional forms ((A2)-(A6)) that were used for 
single females and males.  
  In this case the households choose among opportunities defined by a vector 
( ) ,,,,, MFMFMF hhwwss. Here  1 k S =  if the partner of gender k is employed in the public sector, 
with k = M, F. Analogously to what we have done with singles, we specify the corresponding density 
function as  
(A11)
( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )( )
































The choice density of an opportunity  ( ) ,,,,, MFMFMF hhwwss is: 
(A12)   
( ) ( ) ( )


















For the purpose of empirical specification and estimation it is convenient to divide the density  ( ) p by 











































Now the choice density can be written as follows: 
(A14)
( )









if both work; 
(A15)  ( )







j =  
if only the husband works; 
(A16)  ( )







j =  
if only the wife works; 




j =  








































































The hour densities and the wage densities are the same as specified for singles. The same applies to 
03 () MM ggs  and  03 () FF ggs . Moreover: 
(A19)  ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 03301212 ()()exp11 MFMFMMMMFFFF ggsgsssss mmmmm =++-++- . 
The estimates of the preference parameters for couples are reported in Table A2. 
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Table A2. Estimates of the parameters of the utility function for married/cohabitating couples. 
Norway 1994 
Variable  Parameter  Estimate  Std. Dev. 
Consumption           
  a1  0.14     (0.09)   
  a2  6.49     (0.43)   
Wife’s leisure           
  a3  -3.81     (0.43)   
  a4  194.89     (28.53)   
Log age  a5  -107.09    (15.88)   
Log age squared  a6  15.14     (2.23)   
# children, 0 – 2 years old   a7  0.34     (0.31)   
# children, 3 – 6 years old  a8  1.31     (0.31)   
# children, 7 – 14 years old  a9  1.70     (0.26)   
Employed in public sector   a10  -0.95    (0.30)   
(Empl. in pub. sec.)(# child., 0 – 2 years old)   a11  0.40    (0.33)   
(Empl. in pub. sec.)(# child., 3 – 6 years old)  a12  0.39    (0.32)   
(Empl. in pub. sec.)(# child., 7 – 14 years old)  a13  -0.97    (0.24)   
Husband’s leisure           
  a14  -1.01    (039)   
  a15  222.99    (41.03)   
Log age  a16  -116.55    (22.34)   
Log age squared  a17  15.85    (3.06)   
# children, 0 – 2 years old   a18  -0.08    (0.40)   
# children, 3 – 6 years old  a19  -0.30    (0.35)   
# children, 7 – 14 years old  a20  -0.15    (0.25)   
Employed in public sector   a21  -0.60    (0.51)   
(Empl. in pub. sec.)(# child., 0 – 2 years old)   a22  -0.16    (0.39)   
(Empl. in pub. sec.)(# child., 3 – 6 years old)  a23  -0.93    (0.31)   
(Empl. in pub. sec.)(# child., 7 – 14 years old)  a24  -0.16    (0.25)   
Leisure interaction between spouses  a25  4.84    (1.12)   
*) Standard deviations in parentheses. 
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Table A3. Job, Hours and Wage densities, Norway 1994 
  Females  Males 
 
Parameter 
Estimate  Std. Dev.  Estimate  Std. Dev. 
µ1  -2.10  (0.18)  -3.17  (0.23) 
µ2  -1.51  (0.18)  -2.68  (0.20)  Job opportunity 
µ3  1.39  (0.17)  1.39  (0.17) 
p1  0.49  (0.13)  -0.50  (0.22) 
2 p   -0.23  (0.23)  0.09  (0.51) 
3 p   1.47  (0.09)  1.81  (0.07) 
Hours 
4 p   0.03  (0.14)  0.06  (0.13) 
0 b   3.62  (0.07)  3.50  (0.06) 
1 b   3.93  (0.50)  5.38  (0.41) 
2 b   2.60  (0.30)  2.83  (0.31) 
3 b   -4.04  (0.64)  -4.41  (0.64) 
Wage – Private sector 
s   0.24  (0.00)  0.28  (0.01) 
0 b   3.71  (0.08)  3.62  (0.09) 
1 b   3.59  (0.46)  4.95  (0.47) 
2 b   2.14  (0.33)  2.46  (0.44) 
3 b   -3.37  (0.71)  -3.82  (0.91) 
Wage - Public sector 
s   0.18  (0.01)  0.22  0.01 
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Table A4. Incomes and labour supply under the current tax rule, Norway 1994  
Annual hours  Household income, NOK 1994  Participation rates 




M  F  M  F  M  F 
Gross income  Taxes  Disposable 
income 
I  58    1271    738    82300  11496  70804 
II  84    1340    1124    105212  18564  86648 
III-VIII  89    2040    1812    185304  44527  140778 
IX  97    2218    2147    306905  92142  214762 
X  77    2739    2120    462074  158374  303700 
Single males (M) 
All  85    2003    1701    206694  54708  151986 
I    55    1144    627  83684  10033  73652 
II    71    1346    955  105927  14191  91737 
III-VIII    84    1782    1503  176901  37575  139326 
IX    94    2026    1895  261767  61129  200638 
X    97    2723    2636  323771  79917  243855 
Single females (F) 
All    82    1841    1513  183677  39077  144601 
I  72  58  1433  1100  1036  640  189680  32180  157500 
II  76  78  1624  1239  1227  963  257300  50697  206603 
III-VIII  92  86  2016  1517  1846  1304  399046  102457  296590 
IX  95  93  2376  1750  2259  1626  580544  174194  406350 
X  86  81  2583  1742  2232  1411  828424  258943  569481 
Couples 
I-X  88  83  2029  1510  1783  1246  424994  113064  311931 
 
 